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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 Appellant Lexie Little Carter, III appeals from the 
district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition.  The court 
refused to consider the merits of Carter's petition on the 
2 
grounds that he had failed to exhaust state remedies.  We will 
reverse this decision, and we will remand this case to the district court because the 
district court did not address whether Carter's failure to appeal his claims through the 
state court system resulted in procedural default of his claims.   
I. 
 On July 1, 1991, Carter filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.0  He challenged his conviction on eighteen counts of armed 
robbery and one count of possessing a prohibited offensive weapon.  He also challenged the 
resulting sentence of 182 to 365 years imprisonment imposed by a Pennsylvania court of 
common pleas. Carter alleged that the state court had refused to rule upon his petition 
for writ of error coram nobis, filed on February 27, 1984, during the state criminal 
proceedings against him, and also had refused to rule on his petition for post-conviction 
collateral relief, filed July 15, 1987,0 pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction 
Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 9501-9543 ("PCHA").0  Carter contended that the state 
court's delays violated his rights to due process of law and equal protection, rendering 
the state corrective process ineffective so that exhaustion of state remedies should be 
excused.0 
 The district court did not act on the petition for habeas corpus relief but 
retained jurisdiction and thereafter began monitoring the state court proceedings.0
                     
0
 The claim represented Carter's fifth federal habeas challenge.  The district 
court dismissed the previous four petitions for failure to exhaust state remedies. 
0
 The magistrate's report concluded that the petition raised the same issues 
raised in the writ of error coram nobis. 
0
 The PCHA was amended in 1988 and is now known as the Post Conviction Relief Act 
("PCRA").  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541. 
0
 In addition, Carter reiterated claims that the district court found to have been 
set forth in his previous state court petitions.  He alleged that the Commonwealth 
knowingly elicited perjured testimony in violation of his right to due process of law and 
permitted him to be prosecuted and convicted on a robbery charge that the committing 
magistrate had originally dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage, in violation of his 
rights against double jeopardy. 
0
 Carter also contends that it was error for the district court, at the time his habeas 
petition was filed, to have failed to excuse him from exhausting state remedies because of 
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discovering that the state court had lost Carter's PCHA petition, the court issued an 
order, dated December 11, 1991, mandating that Carter produce a copy of his state post
conviction petition for the respondents and the state court and directing the Commonwealth 
to refile it on Carter's behalf.  The district court continued to oversee the state court 
action until July 1993.  During that time, the district court issued several orders 
requiring the District Attorney's Office of Allegheny County to update it periodically on 
the status of the state court proceedings related to the petition. 
 The district court also ordered Carter's state-appointed attorney, Jack 
Conflenti, to file a copy of a notice of intention to proceed in post-conviction 
proceedings on Carter's behalf.  Conflenti sought and was granted two extensions of time 
to make the filing but eventually withdrew as counsel.  Attorney Erika Kreisman assumed 
representation of Carter and complied with a court order to file a copy of a notice of 
intention to proceed. Kreisman filed an amendment to the PCHA petition in November 1992 
but then requested and was granted two extensions of time to file a supplemental amended 
petition. 
 Ultimately, on July 8, 1993, the court of common pleas issued an order 
dismissing Carter's claims without a hearing and advised him of his rights to file an 
appeal in the superior court within thirty days.  Carter did not appeal.  Moreover, in a 
motion to withdraw from the case, Carter's counsel stated that Carter had directed her not 
to appeal the decision. 
 The Commonwealth then filed a motion in the district court to dismiss Carter's 
habeas petition on the grounds that he had failed to exhaust available state law remedies.  
                                                                                          
the 47 month delay which had already occurred.  We asked for further briefing by the 
parties on this issue.  We now conclude that we do not need to consider whether it was 
error for the district court not to have excused exhaustion at the time of the filing of 
the petition.  The fact that Clark has now received state court review of his PCHA 
petition, renders this issue moot.  See Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 615-16 (3d Cir. 
1995) (comity, record creation concerns, judicial economy, and avoidance of duplicative 
proceedings all argue against a district court ignoring a state court post-conviction 
relief proceeding, even if that proceeding took place only after considerable delay).
4 
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Carter's claims on that 
ground.  Appendix ("App.") at 647.  While noting that Carter's time to appeal had lapsed 
and his claims had therefore defaulted, the magistrate judge concluded that the procedural 
bar issue was not before the court.  App. at 646 n.2. By order entered March 8, 1994, the 
district court adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the 
petition for failure to exhaust state remedies.    
 Although Carter did not appeal the final order denying him post-conviction 
relief in the state trial court, he did file a timely notice of appeal of the denial of 
his habeas petition and requested the issuance of a certificate of probable cause to 
appeal, which a panel of this court granted on August 24, 1994.   
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over this appeal from the 
district court's final order dismissing Carter's petition.  We exercise plenary review 
over the district court's conclusion that state remedies have not been exhausted and that 
exhaustion should not be excused.  Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 1994), 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 593 (1994); Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1991).
II. 
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) & (c), a federal court may not grant an 
application for writ of habeas corpus for a state prisoner until the applicant has 
exhausted available state remedies.0  In general, "a state prisoner seeking federal habeas 
                     
0
 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c) provide: 
 
 (b)  An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it 
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of 
the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective 
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the prisoner. 
 
 (c)  An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he 
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, 
the question presented. 
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relief must present each of his claims to the state's highest court."  Story v. Kindt
F.3d at 405; Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353 (3d Cir. 1986).  Exhaustion does not limit 
the court's jurisdictional power to issue a writ but rather arises from considerations of 
comity.  Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982); Codispoti v. Howard, 589 F.2d 135, 140 
(3d Cir. 1978). Therefore, federal courts may entertain the merits of a petition for 
habeas corpus where state remedies have not been exhausted "when no appropriate remedy 
exists at the state level or when the state process would frustrate the use of an 
available remedy." Story, 26 F.3d at 405. 
 As we have held, "inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing 
claims for relief may render the state remedy effectively unavailable."  Story, 26 F.3d at 
405. Therefore, this court has on previous occasions excused the petitioner from the 
exhaustion requirement where the state court delayed processing the petitioner's 
constitutional claims in post-conviction proceedings.0  Unlike those cases, however, the 
state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claims in the instant case, albeit under 
federal monitoring.  The district court's monitoring effectively prodded the state court 
to address Carter's claims while preserving deference to the Commonwealth and its 
procedural rules.  Under the district court's supervision, the state court procedure 
lasted for little more than a year and a half, from December 11, 1991 to July 8, 1993, 
despite the withdrawal of Carter's first attorney and his second attorney's requests for 
extensions of time to file a supplemental petition.  Thus, Carter had a final appealable 
decision over a year and eight months ago.  Had he appealed the decision through the state 
courts, he then could have presented the federal district court with exhausted claims ripe 
for review. 
                     
0
 See Story, 26 F.3d at 402 (remanding petitioner's case for consideration of the 
merits upon concluding that a nine-year delay in post-conviction collateral proceedings in 
state court was inordinate); Wojtczak, 800 F.2d at 353 (excusing the petitioner's failure 
to exhaust statutory remedies due to a 33-month delay between the filing of state post
conviction petition and the filing of federal habeas petition where the court found 
nothing in the record to indicate that the petitioner was responsible for the delay).
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 Clearly the state court's docketing system, in which the petition for post
conviction relief was lost or misplaced, was inadequate to protect Carter's interests.  
The state court's failure to proceed in the matter until the district court commenced 
monitoring the case almost four and a half years later is reprehensible.0  Nonetheless, 
the district court's decision to monitor the state court proceedings rather than to hold 
the delay in the state collateral proceedings sufficient to excuse the exhaustion 
requirement appropriately respects considerations of comity. 
 The district court recognized that the Pennsylvania courts should have the first 
opportunity to address and correct alleged constitutional violations arising out of 
Carter's conviction and sentencing.  As the Supreme Court explained in Rose, 
 [b]ecause "it would be unseemly in our dual system of  
 government for a federal district court to upset a  
 state court conviction without an opportunity to the 
 state courts to correct a constitutional violation," 
 federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which 
 "teaches that one court should defer action on causes 
 properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of  
 another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 
 cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to 
 pass upon the matter." 
 
Rose, 455 U.S. at 518 (citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). 
III. 
                     
0
 Even more time elapsed between the filing of the petition for writ of error 
coram nobis and the district court's monitoring. As the Appellee argues, however, Carter's 
petition could not have been considered when originally filed.  The writ, which was 
abolished in 1988 by the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
9542, existed at the time of Carter's trial only as an extraordinary post-trial remedy 
"that afford[ed] the trial court an opportunity to correct its own record when vital facts 
[were] discovered that were unknown when the judgment was entered."  Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, 513 A.2d 473, 474 (Pa. Super. 1986).  To be awarded such a writ, a petitioner had 
to demonstrate "(1) [the existence of] facts . . . not in the record and . . . unknown to 
the court when the judgment was announced, and that, if known, would have prevented the 
judgment, and (2) the absence of a remedy at law."  Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Mangini
386 A.2d 482, 490 (Pa. 1978).  Carter did not incorporate the claims in his petition for 
writ of error coram nobis in a post-trial motion until his 1987 PCHA petition.     
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 Carter did not appeal the final and appealable order denying him post-conviction 
relief in the state trial court.  But the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, as 
adopted by the district court, expressly declined to determine whether the failure to 
appeal resulted in procedural default.  App. at 646 n.2.  Nor has any Pennsylvania state 
court held that the claims are defaulted.  Because the parties did not discuss whether 
Pennsylvania state law clearly forecloses state court review of Carter's unexhausted 
claims, we remand this case to the district court to address this issue. 
 This court has previously held that where "no state court has concluded that 
[the] petitioner is procedurally barred from raising his unexhausted claims and state law 
does not clearly require a finding of default," the district court should dismiss the 
habeas petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.  See Toulson v. 
Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 989 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to predict how New Jersey state cour
would resolve procedural default issue).  By so holding, this court recognized that the 
issue of procedural default under state law may be best addressed by state courts in the 
first instance. Id. at 988 n.7.  On remand the district court should determine whether 
there exists any ambiguity as to whether Carter's inaction constitutes procedural default 
pursuant to Pennsylvania state law.  If such ambiguity exists, it should dismiss the 
petition without prejudice.  If, on the other hand, the district court concludes that, 
pursuant to Pennsylvania law, Carter's failure to appeal his claims unambiguously 
constituted procedural default, we direct the district court to conduct a further inquiry.  
The court must then determine whether cause and prejudice existed for Carter's procedural 
default or whether failure to consider Carter's claims would "result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice."  See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).0 
                     
0
 In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that 
 
 [i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted 
 his federal claims in state court pursuant to an  
 independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal 
 habeas review of the claims is barred unless the 
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IV. 
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be reversed and the case 
will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
                                                                                          
 prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and 
 actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation 
 of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider 
 the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
 justice. 
 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.      
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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I concur in the result, because no matter how unconscionable the delay in the 
state proceedings, I agree that they cannot be ignored once they finally take place.  
Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 1995).  Furthermore, while I recognize the purpose 
and propriety of the district court encouraging and even coercing the state court to take 
action, I believe that a time comes when enough is enough.  A petitioner is entitled to 
have his claim that exhaustion of state court remedies should be excused adjudicated as of 
the time his petition is filed.  In this matter, the petitioner had been waiting four 
years for a decision on his postconviction petition before the state court.  
Significantly, when Carter filed his federal habeas petition the state court had not even 
begun to process the postconviction petition and, in fact, its clerk's office had lost 
Carter's petition.  Nonetheless, it was appropriate for the district court in the 
interests of comity to afford a further and reasonable opportunity for the state to act. 
However, in this instance the district court afforded an additional two years.  In my view 
that further delay required that the interests of comity yield to the rights of the 
petitioner.  He was entitled to have an adjudication that the exhaustion requirement was 
excused and to receive a determination on the merits of his petition.   
 However, having finally received a state adjudication, and having failed to 
appeal therefrom, I concur in the order of remand, although I recognize that the history 
of this petitioner's treatment in the state courts might well excuse and explain his 
failure to appeal a decision in state court which came six years after he moved in state 
court and two years after he filed his petition in federal court.  I do not think that 
comity necessarily requires us to await a state court so unmindful of the rights of a 
convicted criminal defendant to have a speedy adjudication of his postconviction claims.
